An Efficient and Secure Attribute-Based Signcryption Scheme for Smart Grid Applications

IACR Eprint - Sat, 12/01/2018 - 09:15
With regards to the development of modern power systems, Smart Grid (SG) as an intelligent generation of electricity networks has been faced with a tremendous attention. Fine-grained data sharing in SG plays a vital role in efficiently managing data flow in the SG. As these data commonly contain sensitive information, design of the secure and efficient privacy-preserving schemes for such networks with plenty of resource constrained devices is one of the most controversial issues. In this paper, we propose a secure Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based SignCryption (CP-ABSC) scheme which simultaneously provides the authenticity and privacy of the users by enforcing an arbitrary access control policy on encrypted data. Since the number of required pairings in the signcryption and designcryption algorithms are independent to the number of the involved attributes, the computational overhead is reduced in comparison with the existing schemes in the literature. In addition, we formally prove that the unforgeability and indistinguishability of the proposed scheme are reducible to the well-known hardness assumption of the q-Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (q-BDHE) problem. Moreover, we show that embedding a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) in each smart meter will significantly reduce the storage overhead of the protocol and secure it against non-volatile memory attackers.

A Note on Key Rank

IACR Eprint - Fri, 11/30/2018 - 12:19
In recent years key rank has become an important aspect of side-channel analysis, enabling an evaluation lab to analyse the security of a device after a side-channel attack. In particular, it enables the lab to do so when the enumeration effort would be beyond their computing power. Due to its importance there has been a host of work investigating key rank over the last few years. In this work we build upon the existing literature to make progress on understanding various properties of key rank. We begin by showing when two different "scoring methods" will provide the same rank. This has been implicitly used by various algorithms in the past but here it is shown for a large class of functions. We conclude by giving the computational complexity of key rank. This implies that it is unlikely for, considerably, better algorithms to exist.

Round5: Compact and Fast Post-Quantum Public-Key Encryption

IACR Eprint - Fri, 11/30/2018 - 11:00
Standardization bodies such as NIST and ETSI are currently seeking quantum resistant alternatives to vulnerable RSA and elliptic curve-based public-key algorithms. In this context, we present Round5, a lattice-based cryptosystem providing a key encapsulation mechanism and a public-key encryption scheme. Round5 is based on the General Learning with Rounding problem, unifying non-ring and ring lattice rounding problems into one. Usage of rounding combined with a tight analysis leads to significantly reduced bandwidth and randomness requirements. Round5's reliance on prime-order cyclotomic rings offers a large design space allowing fine-grained parameter optimization. The use of sparse-ternary secret keys improves performance and significantly reduces decryption failure rates at minimal additional cost. The use of error-correcting codes, in combination with ring multiplications in $\mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^{n+1}-1)$ that ensures non-correlated errors, further improves the latter. Round5 parameters have been carefully optimized for bandwidth, while the design facilitates efficient implementation. As a result, Round5 has leading performance characteristics among all NIST post-quantum candidates, and at the same time attains conservative security levels that fully fit NIST's security categories. Round5's schemes share common building blocks, simplifying (security and operational) analysis and code review. Finally, Round5 proposes various approaches of refreshing the system public parameter A, which efficiently prevent precomputation and back-door attacks. \\ \textbf{Disclaimer:} This is a draft version, not all sections are included.

Identity-based Encryption Tightly Secure under Chosen-ciphertext Attacks

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 21:47
We propose the first identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme that is (almost) tightly secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. Our scheme is efficient, in the sense that its ciphertext overhead is only seven group elements, three group elements more than that of the state-of-the-art passively (almost) tightly secure IBE scheme. Our scheme is secure in a multi-challenge setting, i.e., in face of an arbitrary number of challenge ciphertexts. The security of our scheme is based upon the standard symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption in pairing-friendly groups, but we also consider (less efficient) generalizations under weaker assumptions.

The Multi-User Security of Double Encryption

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 11:32
It is widely known that double encryption does not substantially increase the security of a block cipher. Indeed, the classical meet-in-the middle attack recovers the $2k$-bit secret key at the cost of roughly $2^k$ off-line enciphering operations, in addition to very few known plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Thus, essentially as efficiently as for the underlying cipher with a $k$-bit key. This paper revisits double encryption under the lens of multi-user security. We prove that its security degrades only very mildly with an increasing number of users, as opposed to single encryption, where security drops linearly. More concretely, we give a tight bound for the multi-user security of double encryption as a pseudorandom permutation in the ideal-cipher model, and describe matching attacks. Our contribution is also conceptual: To prove our result, we enhance and generalize the generic technique recently proposed by Hoang and Tessaro for lifting single-user to multi-user security. We believe this technique to be broadly applicable.

On generalized Feistel networks

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 11:27
We prove beyond-birthday-bound security for the well-known types of generalized Feistel networks, including: (1) unbalanced Feistel networks, where the $n$-bit to $m$-bit round functions may have $n\ne m$; (2) alternating Feistel networks, where the round functions alternate between contracting and expanding; (3) type-1, type-2, and type-3 Feistel networks, where $n$-bit to $n$-bit round functions are used to encipher $kn$-bit strings for some $k\ge2$; and (4) numeric variants of any of the above, where one enciphers numbers in some given range rather than strings of some given size. Using a unified analytic framework we show that, in any of these settings, for any $\varepsilon>0$, with enough rounds, the subject scheme can tolerate CCA attacks of up to $q\sim N^{1-\varepsilon}$ adversarial queries, where $N$ is the size of the round functions' domain (the size of the larger domain for alternating Feistel). This is asymptotically optimal. Prior analyses for generalized Feistel networks established security to only $q\sim N^{0.5}$ adversarial queries.

A new SNOW stream cipher called SNOW-V

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 11:12
In this paper we are proposing a new member in the SNOW family of stream ciphers, called SNOW-V. The motivation is to meet an industry demand of very high speed encryption in a virtualized environment, something that can be expected to be relevant in a future 5G mobile communication system. We are revising the SNOW 3G architecture to be competitive in such a pure software environment, making use of both existing acceleration instructions for the AES encryption round function as well as the ability of modern CPUs to handle large vectors of integers (e.g. the Advanced Vector Extensions AVX from Intel). We have kept the general design from SNOW 3G, in terms of linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and Finite State Machine (FSM), but both entities are updated to better align with vectorized implementations. The LFSR part is new and operates 8 times the speed of the FSM. We have furthermore increased the total state size by using 128-bit registers in the FSM, we use the full AES encryption round function in the FSM update, and, finally, the initialization phase includes a masking with key bits at its end. The result is an algorithm generally much faster than AES-256 and with expected security not worse than AES-256.

On the (non) obfuscating power of Garside Normal Forms

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 11:12
Braid groups are infinite non-abelian groups naturally arising from geometric braids that have been used in cryptography for the last two decades. In braid group cryptography public braids often contain secret braids as a factor and it is hoped that rewriting the product of braid words hides the individual factors. We provide experimental evidence that this is in general not the case and argue that under certain conditions parts of the Garside normal form of factors can be found in the Garside normal form of their product. This observation can be exploited to decompose products in braid groups of the form $ABC$ when only $B$ is known. Our decomposition algorithm yields a universal forgery attack on WalnutDSA^TM, which is one of the 20 proposed signature schemes that are being considered by NIST for standardization of quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms. Our attack on WalnutDSA^TM can universally forge signatures within seconds for both the 128-bit and 256-bit security level, given one random message-signature pair. The attack worked on 99.8% and 100% of signatures for the 128-bit and 256-bit security levels in our experiments. Furthermore, we show that the decomposition algorithm can be used to solve instances of the conjugacy search problem and decomposition search problem in braid groups. These problems are at the heart of other cryptographic schemes based on braid groups.

Fast Authentication from Aggregate Signatures with Improved Security

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 11:11
An attempt to derive signer-efficient digital signatures from aggregate signatures was made in a signature scheme referred to as Structure-free Compact Rapid Authentication (SCRA) (IEEE TIFS 2017). In this paper, we first mount a practical universal forgery attack against the NTRU instantiation of SCRA by observing only 8161 signatures. Second, we propose a new signature scheme (FAAS), which transforms any single-signer aggregate signature scheme into a signer-efficient scheme. We show two efficient instantiations of FAAS, namely, FAAS-NTRU and FAAS-RSA, both of which achieve high computational efficiency. Our experiments confirmed that FAAS schemes achieve up to 100x faster signature generation compared to their underlying schemes. Moreover, FAAS schemes eliminate some of the costly operations such as Gaussian sampling, rejection sampling, and exponentiation at the signature generation that are shown to be susceptible to side-channel attacks. This enables FAAS schemes to enhance the security and efficiency of their underlying schemes. Finally, we prove that FAAS schemes are secure (in random oracle model), and open-source both our attack and FAAS implementations for public testing purposes.

Efficient Fully-Leakage Resilient One-More Signature Schemes

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 11:11
In a recent paper Faonio, Nielsen and Venturi (ICALP 2015) gave new constructions of leakage-resilient signature schemes. The signature schemes proposed remain unforgeable against an adversary leaking arbitrary information on the entire state of the signer, including the random coins of the signing algorithm. The main feature of their signature schemes is that they offer a graceful degradation of security in situations where standard existential unforgeability is impossible. The notion, put forward by Nielsen, Venturi, and Zottarel (PKC 2014), defines a slack parameter $\gamma$ which, roughly speaking, describes how gracefully the security degrades. Unfortunately, the standard-model signature scheme of Faonio,Nielsen and Venturi has a slack parameter that depends on the number of signatures queried by the adversary. In this paper we show two new constructions in the standard model where the above limitation is avoided. Specifically, the first scheme achieves slack parameter $O(1/\lambda)$ where $\lambda$ is the security parameter and it is based on standard number theoretic assumptions, the second scheme achieves optimal slack parameter (i.e. $\gamma = 1$) and it is based on knowledge of the exponent assumptions. Our constructions are efficient and have leakage rate $1 - o(1)$, most notably our second construction has signature size of only 8 group elements which makes it the leakage-resilient signature scheme with the shortest signature size known to the best of our knowledge.

Breaking the Binding: Attacks on the Merkle Approach to Prove Liabilities and its Applications

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 11:09
Proofs of liabilities are used for applications, function like banks or Bitcoin exchanges, to prove the sums of money in their dataset that they should owe. The Maxwell protocol, a cryptographic proof of liabilities scheme which relies on a data structure well known as the summation Merkle tree, utilizes a Merkle approach to prove liabilities in the decentralized setting, i.e., clients independently verify they are in the dataset with no trusted auditor. In this paper, we go into the Maxwell protocol and the summation Merkle tree. We formalize the Maxwell protocol and show it is not secure. We present an attack with which the proved liabilities using the Maxwell protocol are less than the actual value. This attack can have significant consequences: A Bitcoin exchange controlling a total of $n$ client accounts can present valid liabilities proofs including only one account balance in its dataset. We suggest two improvements to the Maxwell protocol and the summation Merkle tree, and present a formal proof for the improvement that is closest in spirit to the Maxwell protocol. Moreover, we show the DAM scheme, a micropayment scheme of Zerocash which adopts the Maxwell protocol as a tool to disincentivize double/multiple spending, is vulnerable to an multi-spending attack. We show the Provisions scheme, which adopts the Maxwell protocol to extend its privacy-preserving proof of liabilities scheme, is also infected by a similar attack.

Online Authenticated-Encryption and its Nonce-Reuse Misuse-Resistance

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 10:11
A definition of \textit{online authenticated-encryption} (OAE), call it OAE1, was given by Fleischmann, Forler, and Lucks (2012). It has become a popular definitional target because, despite allowing encryption to be online, security is supposed to be maintained even if nonces get reused. We argue that this expectation is effectively wrong. OAE1 security has also been claimed to capture best-possible security for any online-AE scheme. We claim that this understanding is wrong, too. So motivated, we redefine OAE-security, providing a radically different formulation, OAE2. The new notion effectively \textit{does} capture best-possible security for a user's choice of plaintext segmentation and ciphertext expansion. It is achievable by simple techniques from standard tools. Yet even for OAE2, nonce-reuse can still be devastating. The picture to emerge is that no OAE definition can meaningfully tolerate nonce-reuse, but, at the same time, OAE security ought neverhave been understood to turn on this question.

A Constructive Perspective on Signcryption Security

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 08:37
Signcryption is a public-key cryptographic primitive, originally introduced by Zheng (Crypto '97), that allows parties to establish secure communication without the need of prior key agreement. Instead, a party registers its public key at a certificate authority (CA), and only needs to retrieve the public key of the intended partner from the CA before being able to protect the communication. Signcryption schemes provide both authenticity and confidentiality of sent messages and can offer a simpler interface to applications and better performance compared to generic compositions of signature and encryption schemes. Although introduced two decades ago, the question which security notions of signcryption are adequate in which applications has still not reached a fully satisfactory answer. To resolve this question, we conduct a constructive analysis of this public-key primitive. Similar to previous constructive studies for other important primitives, this treatment allows to identify the natural goal that signcryption schemes should achieve and to formalize this goal in a composable framework. More specifically, we capture the goal of signcryption as a gracefully-degrading secure network, which is basically a network of independent parties that allows secure communication between any two parties. However, when a party is compromised, its respective security guarantees are lost, while all guarantees for the remaining users remain unaffected. We show which security notions for signcryption are sufficient to construct this kind of secure network from a certificate authority (or key registration resource) and insecure communication. Our study does not only unveil that it is the so-called insider-security notion that enables this construction, but also that a weaker version thereof would already be sufficient. This may be of interest in the context of practical signcryption schemes that do not achieve the stronger notions. Last but not least, we observe that the graceful-degradation property is actually an essential feature of signcryption that stands out in comparison to alternative and more standard constructions that achieve secure communication from the same assumptions. This underlines the vital importance of the insider security notion for signcryption and strongly supports, in contrast to the initial belief, the recent trend to consider the insider security notion as the standard notion for signcryption.

On Composable Security for Digital Signatures

IACR Eprint - Thu, 11/29/2018 - 08:34
A digital signature scheme (DSS), which consists of a key-generation, a signing, and a verification algorithm, is an invaluable tool in cryptography. The first and still most widely used security definition for a DSS, existential unforgeability under chosen-message attack, was introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest in 1988. As DSSs serve as a building block in numerous complex cryptographic protocols, a security definition that specifies the guarantees of a DSS under composition is needed. Canetti (FOCS 2001, CSFW 2004) as well as Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner (CCS 2003) have described ideal functionalities for signatures in their respective composable-security frameworks. While several variants of these functionalities exist, they all share that the verification key and signature values appear explicitly. In this paper, we describe digital signature schemes from a different, more abstract perspective. Instead of modeling all aspects of a DSS in a monolithic ideal functionality, our approach characterizes a DSS as a construction of a repository for authentically reading values written by a certain party from certain assumed repositories, e.g., for transmitting verification key and signature values. This approach resolves several technical complications of previous simulation-based approaches, captures the security of signature schemes in an abstract way, and allows for modular proofs. We show that our definition is equivalent to existential unforgeability. We then model two example applications: (1) the certification of values via a signature from a specific entity, which with public keys as values is the core functionality of public-key infrastructures, and (2) the authentication of a session between a client and a server with the help of a digitally signed assertion from an identity provider. Single-sign-on mechanisms such as SAML rely on the soundness of the latter approach.

Leakage-Resilient Secret Sharing

IACR Eprint - Wed, 11/28/2018 - 23:02
In this work, we consider the natural goal of designing secret sharing schemes that ensure security against a powerful adaptive adversary who may learn some ``leaked'' information about all the shares. We say that a secret sharing scheme is $p$-party leakage-resilient, if the secret remains statistically hidden even after an adversary learns a bounded amount of leakage, where each bit of leakage can depend jointly on the shares of an adaptively chosen subset of $p$ parties. A lot of works have focused on designing secret sharing schemes that handle individual and (mostly) non-adaptive leakage for (some) threshold secret sharing schemes [DP07,DDV10,LL12,ADKO15,GK18,BDIR18]. We give an unconditional compiler that transforms any standard secret sharing scheme with arbitrary access structure into a $p$-party leakage-resilient one for $p$ logarithmic in the number of parties. This yields the first secret sharing schemes secure against adaptive and joint leakage for more than two parties. As a natural extension, we initiate the study of leakage-resilient non-malleable secret sharing} and build such schemes for general access structures. We empower the computationally unbounded adversary to adaptively leak from the shares and then use the leakage to tamper with each of the shares arbitrarily and independently. Leveraging our $p$-party leakage-resilient schemes, we also construct such non-malleable secret sharing schemes: any such tampering either preserves the secret or completely `destroys' it. This improves upon the non-malleable secret sharing scheme of Goyal and Kumar (CRYPTO 2018) where no leakage was permitted. Leakage-resilient non-malleable codes can be seen as 2-out-of-2 schemes satisfying our guarantee and have already found several applications in cryptography [LL12,ADKO15,GKPRS18,GK18,CL18,OPVV18]. Our constructions rely on a clean connection we draw to communication complexity in the well-studied number-on-forehead (NOF) model and rely on functions that have strong communication-complexity lower bounds in the NOF model (in a black-box way). We get efficient $p$-party leakage-resilient schemes for $p$ upto $O(\log n)$ as our share sizes have exponential dependence on $p$. We observe that improving this dependence from $2^{O(p)}$ to $2^{o(p)}$ will lead to progress on longstanding open problems in complexity theory.

Genus 2 curves with given split Jacobian

IACR Eprint - Wed, 11/28/2018 - 23:01
We construct a genus 2 curve inside the product of 2 elliptic curves. The formula for this construction has appeared in a previous paper. The current paper discusses how this formula arises naturally by using some theory of elliptic Kummer surfaces

A Provably-Secure Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme Without Pairing in the Random Oracle Model

IACR Eprint - Wed, 11/28/2018 - 23:01
Proxy re-encryption (PRE) enables delegation of decryption rights by entrusting a proxy server with special information, that allows it to transform a ciphertext under one public key into a ciphertext of the same message under a different public key. It is important to note that, the proxy which performs the re-encryption learns nothing about the message encrypted under either public keys. Due to its transformation property, proxy re-encryption schemes have practical applications in distributed storage, encrypted email forwarding, Digital Rights Management (DRM) and cloud storage. From its introduction, several proxy re-encryption schemes have been proposed in the literature, and a majority of them have been realized using bilinear pairing. In Africacrypt 2010, the first PKI-based collusion resistant CCA secure PRE scheme without pairing was proposed in the random oracle model. In this paper, we point out an important weakness in the scheme. We also present the first collusion-resistant pairing-free unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme which meets CCA security under a variant of the computational Diffie-Hellman hardness assumption in the random oracle model.

PoTS - A Secure Proof of TEE-Stake for Permissionless Blockchains

IACR Eprint - Wed, 11/28/2018 - 23:00
Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols have been actively researched for the past few years. PoS finds direct applicability in permissionless blockchain platforms and emerges as one of the strongest candidates to replace the largely inefficient Proof of Work mechanism that is currently plugged in the majority of existing permissionless blockchain systems. Although a number of PoS variants have been proposed, these protocols suffer from a number of security shortcomings. Namely, most existing PoS variants are either subject to the nothing at stake, the long range, or the stake grinding attacks which considerably degrade security in the blockchain. These shortcomings do not result from a lack of foresight when designing these protocols, but are inherently due to the ease of manipulating "stake" when compared to other more established variants, such as "work". In this paper, we address these problems and propose a secure Proof of Stake protocol, PoTS, that leverages Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX, to ensure that each miner can generate at most one block per "height" for strictly increasing heights—thus thwarting the problem of nothing at stake and a large class of long-range attacks. In combination with TEEs, PoTS additionally uses cryptographic techniques to also prevent grinding attacks and protect against posterior corruption. We show that our protocol is secure, in the sense of well-established cryptographic notions for blockchain protocols, down to realistic hardware assumptions on TEE and well-established cryptographic assumptions. Finally, we evaluate the performance of our proposal by means of implementation. Our evaluation results show that PoTS offers a strong tradeoff between security of performance of the underlying PoS protocol.

Echoes of the Past: Recovering Blockchain Metrics From Merged Mining

IACR Eprint - Wed, 11/28/2018 - 22:58
So far, the topic of merged mining has mainly been considered in a security context, covering issues such as mining power centralization or crosschain attack scenarios. In this work we show that key information for determining blockchain metrics such as the fork rate can be recovered through data extracted from merge mined cryptocurrencies. Specifically, we reconstruct a long-ranging view of forks and stale blocks in Bitcoin from its merge mined child chains, and compare our results to previous findings that were derived from live measurements. Thereby, we show that live monitoring alone is not sufficient to capture a large majority of these events, as we are able to identify a non-negligible portion of stale blocks that were previously unaccounted for. Their authenticity is ensured by cryptographic evidence regarding both, their position in the respective blockchain, as well as the Proof-of-Work difficulty. Furthermore, by applying this new technique to Litecoin and its child cryptocur rencies, we are able to provide the first extensive view and lower bound on the stale block and fork rate in the Litecoin network. Finally, we outline that a recovery of other important metrics and blockchain characteristics through merged mining may also be possible.

A Public Key Exchange Cryptosystem Based on Ideal Secrecy

IACR Eprint - Wed, 11/28/2018 - 22:56
This paper proposes two closely related asymmetric key (or a public key) schemes for key exchange whose security is based on the notion of ideal secrecy. In the first scheme, the private key consists of two singular matrices, a polar code matrix and a random permutation matrix all over the binary field. The sender transmits addition of two messages over a public channel using the public key of the receiver. The receiver can decrypt individual messages using the private key. An adversary, without the knowledge of the private key, can only compute multiple equiprobable solutions in a space of sufficiently large size related to the dimension of the kernel of the singular matrices. This achieves security in the sense of ideal secrecy. The next scheme extends over general matrices. The two schemes are cryptanalyzed against various attacks.

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